CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
INVESTMENT PRACTICES OF ENDOWMENTS
AND PENSION FUNDS
JAMS W. WoosM, JR.*

During the inflationary period of the past ten years, and particularly during the
more violent phase of the past five years, the most immediate and pressing problem
of the investment managers of endowed funds has been to attempt to increase
income at a rate commensurate with the decrease experienced in the purchasing power
of the income received. Most endowed funds have succeeded only partially in
maintaining their income as expressed in terms of what that income can accomplish.
Some, however, have been much more successful in this respect than have others.
The reasons behind this variation in results afford an interesting picture of conflicting investment theories and practices.
In speaking of "endowments," or "endowed funds," or of "pension funds," it is
important to realize that one is not speaking of a homogeneous entity, but rather
of a group of capital aggregations having some, but far from all, common characteristics. It is, therefore, not possible to speak with definiteness and exactness of
the total dollar amount of such "endowed funds," as one can speak, for example,
of the total of commercial bank deposits. The total size of "endowments" in this
country is conditioned to a considerable extent by the definition applied to "endowments." Even after a satisfactory definition has been agreed upon, there still
remains the fact that there is no central reporting agency or association having contacts with endowment or pension funds.
In general, endowments fall into one of several generic groupings. Institutions
of higher education, chiefly colleges and universities, form one such group. The i95i
World Almanac' lists 193 colleges with endowments of 2 million dollars or more,
the total endowme nts of these 193 colleges having a reported value in excess of ix/
billion dollars. Philanthropic foundations with assets of i million dollars or more
are listed in the 1951 World Almanac in the number of 35. Their total assets exceed
iY2 billion dollars. 2 Many hospitals depend upon income from endowment to help
meet annual operating deficits. There are over 6,5oo registered hospitals in the
United States,8 and although their total of endowed funds is not available, there are
many metropolitan hospitals whose known endowments run into multiple millions
of dollars. The growth of pension fund assets is a relatively new phenomenon. No
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figures are published on the total principal amount of such funds, but underwriters
of investment securities will attest to the importance of such funds as prospective
purchasers of securities. The rapid asset growth of pension funds, and the "new
money" which they regularly have available for investment, gives a dynamic character to their investment decisions and operations. One such pension fund reputedly
has i million dollars a week available for investment.
The total dollar size of endowed funds is obviously substantial. However, it is
not size alone, nor even predominantly size, which gives these accumulations of
capital their greatest significance. In an economy where the education, health, and
welfare of the citizens are becoming of increasing interest to government-federal,
state, and local-the value and the importance of private, independent agencies and
institutions in these fields increases. The strength and vitality of these privately
endowed organizations for the public good become a matter of general interest and
concern. The ability of most of these eleemosynary institutions to continue to serve
the public is dependent upon the earning power of their invested, endowed funds.
A generation ago, the traditional form of conservative investments for widows, for
orphans, and for endowments, was corporate bonds. In the year 1924 corporate
bonds of about 21 billion dollars were outstanding.4 In New York State only i6.1
per cent of these bonds were legal investments for savings banks and trust funds,
and no public utility or industrial bonds were included in the so-called "legal
list."5 The result was that the bond investments of most conservatively administered
endowments a quarter century ago were largely railroad bonds.
The great depression of 1929-1933 changed many things. Concepts of what
constituted a conservative investment program underwent basic changes. New
standards for measuring safety of principal were developed. Ideas as to the value
and the limitations of diversification as a safety device were re-examined. Investment objectives were re-appraised and re-defined, and new investment policies
and practices were developed to implement these objectives. Governmental influence, leading to governmental control, over interest rates, appeared. Commodity
prices, and the cost of living, increased. Many endowed institutions, in common
with retired pensioners, found their dollar income either stable or declining at a
time when the dollar costs of their expenditures were increasing. Under the urgency
of this double spur, there has been much sober thinking, and some appropriate action,
on the part of those responsible for the management of endowed funds.
In the establishment and growth of endowments, whether in the educational,
health, or general welfare fields, the customary emphasis has, quite properly, bden
placed upon the purpose to be served by the endowment. In other words, the
emphasis has been upon useful and efficient employment of funds, rather than upon
the management of capital. The real work of the endowment can, therefore, be said
to have commenced when funds, either income or principal or bbth, have become
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available for the charitable or educational purpose for which the endowment was
established. The management of the income producing capital funds which provide the sine qua non of the endowment's operations has often been delegated to a
group of trustees or a committee, or some outside agency or individual. When the
management of capital becomes a part-time job, with divided responsibility, the
chances for successfully competing with full-time, professional money managers,
come under a tremendous handicap.
In the rapidly changing economic scene which characterizes our economy, successful investment has become a dynamic activity calling for training, technical competence, judgment, and imagination, to mention but a few of the more obvious
qualifications. No longer is it possible, if it ever was, casually to open the daily
paper to the financial section, select a few well known corporate bonds, check the
adequacy of their rating by the financial services and their inclusion in a representative "legal list," and then complacently clip interest coupons semiannually until
maturity, at which time full cash payment of principal will be received. No longer
is any investment good enough to purchase and then forget, nor should the placing
of hard earned capital dollars at work, and hence at risk, be undertaken as casually
as the purchase of a suit of clothes. Furthermore, interest rates on investment
quality bonds have declined to a point where few, if any, endowments are able to
function and continue to work towards their philanthropic objectives, on the lean
diet provided by such yields. The pressure of outside events has, therefore, forced
endowment trustees and managements to consider the sources of their income, and
ways and means of assuring its future availability in a reasonably adequate amount.
This sometimes forced consideration of investment operations has not been an
unmixed evil. It has, in some cases, resulted in improvements, which were long
overdue, in policies and practices, but which might have gone uncorrected for an
indefinite further period, had not the exigencies of maintaining or increasing income
brought about a review of prevailing activities. In some cases, there was no policy
to review or modify, investment having been on a purely informal basis, controlled
only by the expedience of the moment as individual decisions had to be made
on the purchase, sale, or reinvestment of specific securities.
Because of the diversity of objectives and of legal or other limitations as among
endowed funds, no single investment policy will apply to the field as a whole.
However, because generalizations must be made in speaking of endowments as a
group, it does not follow that individual endowed funds should be content with an
indefinite or ambiguous method of investment operation. An investment plan,
or policy, or program, or blueprint is not something which can be, or should be,
acquired in standardized form, as one would select a size 7 hat or size xo shoes.
Nor should an investment plan be adopted simply because it is "fashionable" to have
one, and to be able to refer to "our investment policy," with the implication that all
well run endowments should be so equipped.
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An investment policy is a strictly functional device. It is not s6mething that is
superimposed from the outside. It should be the outgrowth of definite, individual
needs in the management of money, and it should help form the bridge between

the non-profit objectives of the endowment and the tangible, profit-produced dollars
which make possible the partial materialization of these objectives in a practical
world.
In order to have some basis for comparing the general outline of any individual
investment concept with the opinions of others in the same field, faced with more
or less the same problems, it is of interest to note the results of decisions reached by
representative investment managers. Several guideposts for this purpose are, fortunately, available.
The first is a study prepared in 1947 by Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Investment
Counsel, entitled, "Survey of University and College Endowment Funds." This
survey includes data obtained from 59 institutions whose endowment funds totaled
approximately 1,3oo million dollars. This sum represented 77 per cent of all
college and university endowment funds according to Scudder, Stevens & Clark's
estimate as of that date. The coverage of endowment funds of over io million dollars
was judged as being 84 per cent.
In 1931 the investment firm of Wood, Struthers & Company made and published
a survey of the investment portfolios of universities and colleges. The coverage
was not the same as that of the Scudder, Stevens & Clark study, since it included only
30 institutions, rather than 59. It did, however, cover colleges and universities
reporting 74 per cent of the combined investments of all institutions of higher education in the United States having endowments in excess of 5 million dollars each.
Indicative of changes in investment philosophy on the part of the managers of
these endowed funds are the shifts in emphasis as among major investment groups
during the 15 year period between these two studies. For purposes of comparison, all
investments have been listed under one of four general headings:
High Grade Securities-This includes cash, United States Government bonds, utility,
railroad and industrial, foreign and municipal bonds rated as high grade, and utility,
railroad and industrial preferred stocks which enjoy a margin of safety wide enough so
that assurance of continued dividend payments is comparable with the assurance of
interest payments on high grade bonds.
Senior Risk Securities-This includes all bonds and preferred stocks not included above
as high grade.
Common Stocks.
Real Estate Mortgages, Real Estate, and Miscellaneous-Because of the impossibility in
this survey of appraising the quality of various real estate mortgages, parcels of real estate,
and miscellaneous assets, these have been put into a separate functional group.

In 1931 the institutions included in the Wood, Struthers survey.had 36V per cent
of total endowed funds represented by "High Grade" items as defined above. In
1946 the Scudder, Stevens & Clark group showed an almost identical percentage,
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namely 37 per cent. However, the internal composition of this "High Grade"
classification underwent substantial changes during the intervening 15 years. Railroad bonds declined from 123/2 per cent of total investments to i per cent, utility
bonds from Io/ 2 to 3,per cent, industrial bonds from 4 per cent to i per cent, and
preferred stocks from 2 per cent to i per cent. The only classification in the
"High Grade" grouping to show an increase between 1931 and X946 was United
States Government securities which increased their proportion of total investments
from 2 per cent to 27 per cent. As a result, in 1946 the "High Grade" portion of
total invested assets, although but little changed over a 15 year period in size in relation to funds as a whole, had become predominantly an aggregation of United States
Government securities.
Securities occupying a senior position in company capitalizations, but involving
a material degree of risk, i.e., "Senior Risk" securities, declined in relative size between 1931 and 1946. In the former year they accounted for just one quarter of total

investments. The largest items in this classification were utility bonds (7 per cent of
total investments), industrial bonds (5 per cent), and railroad bonds (3 per cent).
All preferred stocks in this "Senior Risk" group were 6 per cent of total investments.
By 1946 the total of "Senior Risk" securities had been reduced from 25 per cent of
total investments to 19 per cent. Railroad, utility and industrial bonds in the group
declined from an aggregate of 15 per cent of total investments to 8 per cent,
while preferred stocks rose from 6 per cent to io per cent.
Real estate, mortgages, and miscellaneous investments are considered as a third
group in the Scudder, Stevens & Clark-Wood, Struthers studies. In 193X this
group represented 27 per cent of total assets. By 1946 its relative size had been
halved-to 13Y2 per cent. This shrinkage was caused by a moderate decline, from
9 per cent to 8 per cent in real estate, and a major decrease in mortgages, from 17
per cent to 5Y per cent.
The final major investment classification is common stocks. In 1931 they
accounted for 11!/ per cent of total assets-the smallest of the four major groups.
By 1946 they had nearly tripled in size-to 30 per cent. Not all common stock subgroups increased during these 15 years. Railroad common stocks declined slightly,
from 2 per cent of total assets to i per cent. The great increase took place in
industrial common stocks, which accounted for 20 per cent of total assets in X946 as
against only 4 per cent in i931.
The chief reason for this trend away from "Senior Risk" securities and mortgages
into common stocks, and particularly into industrial common stocks, was, no doubt,
the attempt to maintain or increase dollar income and principal values at a time
when income from high grade bonds and preferred stocks was declining, due to
governmental decisions, and the purchasing power of such income dollars as were
earned was also shrinking.
Mr. James J. Faggiano of the Old Colony Trust Company of Boston, in a thesis
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entitled, "Investment Trends in College and University Endowment Funds," submitted to the Graduate School of Banking at Rutgers University in 1948, estimated
the degree of change in endowment income return and purchasing power between
the years 1926 and 1947.6 The year i926 was taken as a base. In this year the rate
of income on a representative group of college endowments was 5.14 per cent. In
1947 the rate had fallen to 4.00 per cent, or 77.9 per cent of the base figure. A large
portion of college endowment income is spent for services. Mr. Faggiano next compared this reduced rate of return with the Survey of Current Business index of the
average annual earnings of full-time employes of educational institutions. Taking
1929 as a base (1926 not available) the index of average earnings rose to 134.5 per cent
in 1946 (1947 not available). The combination of a lower rate of income and
higher salary costs reduced Mr. Faggiano's "Index of Endowment Utility" for services
to 58 in 1946 from 1oo in 1929. A second major area of costs in college operation
falls in the field of commodities-fuel, supplies, etc. Using the Index of Wholesale Commodity Prices of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Mr. Faggiano's "Index of Endowment Utility" for commodities in 1947 was 51.5 per cent of
its 1926 level. During the past four or five years there has not been any great change
in money rates, nor, presumably, in the average rate of return on endowed funds
which doubtless remains in the neighborhood of 4.00 per cent. Wages, salaries, and
commodity prices, however, have continued to soar. The Bureau of Labor Statistics'
Index of Wholesale Commodity Prices, which was i51.6 in 1947 when Mr. Faggiano's
Index of Endowment Utility for commodities was 51.5 per cent, had risen to 1824
by mid i951. Taking into account the reduction in the rate of income of college
endowments in the past twenty-five years and the rise in the rate of college operating
expenses, it is evident that the Index of Endowment Utility has been roughly cut
in half during that time.
Despite these rather disheartening trends, income from endowments remains a
major factor in the operations of our colleges. According to a report of the Committee on Education of the House of Representatives 22.7 per cent of the total income
of privately administered colleges and universities in the United States in 1942 was
obtained from income on endowment.' This compares with 29.8 per cent in i92o,8
and suggests that endowment income today is in the vicinity of one fifth the total
income of colleges and universities.
Most of the statistical material previously discussed deals with average, or with
overall experience. There is, however, a wide divergence in the investment position
of individual endowed institutions. The Scudder, Stevens & Clark survey of 1947
disclosed some interesting differences in portfolio composition between various colleges, based on size of endowment. Endowment funds with assets of io million
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dollars or more averaged 9 percentage points more in high grade securities than
did those funds of less than io million dollars. The smaller funds, on the other hand,
had larger holdings of "Senior Risk" securities, as vell as real estate and common
stocks. As a result of this variation in asset distribution larger funds in 1946 earned
at the annual rate of 3.94 per cent of book value as against 4.06 per cent for the smaller
funds.' Scudder, Stevens & Clark state,'
One of the outstanding facts revealed by this survey is the wide variation in investment
proportions held by these 59 universities and colleges.
Certain extreme examples follow.
The average holding of the 59 schools in high grade securities in 1946 was 37 per
cent. One small college had 8r per cent of total assets in high grade securities,
and two large colleges had 77 per cent and 75 per cent. At the other extreme, five
colleges had less than io per cent of assets in high grade securities. The average
holding of all 59 colleges and universities in "Senior Risk" securities was 19 per cent.
However, one medium sized school had 56 per cent of its assets in this type of
obligation and four others had holdings of one third or more of total funds in
this group. Real estate and mortgages averaged I3V2 per cent of the total assets of all
59 schools, but one large college had 70 per cent of its assets in this form of investment, and four other colleges of varying sizes had from 42 per cent to 58 per cent.
Common stocks averaged 30 per cent of total assets for the group as a whole. One
small college, however, had 72 per cent of total assets in commons while seven others,
also small with but one exception, had half or more of total investments in the common stock classification. Five colleges had less than io per cent of total investments
in common stocks and an additional six had from io to 20 per cent. Most of these
eleven schools were medium or large in size.
The Exchange, a monthly publication of the New York Stock Exchange, in its
April 1951 issue contains an article entitled, "Most Popular Stocks in Endowments."
Data are given for seven large eastern universities, and three major philanthropic
foundations, on their "major" common stock commitments. A sliding scale of the
number of shares of stock considered a "major" holding was employed, requiring
a block of 20,000 shares for the largest institution to i,ooo shares for the smallest.
No single stock constituted a "major" holding for all ten institutions, but General
Electric, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Union Carbide & Carbon qualified for
all but one. Sears, Roebuck & Co. was owned in "major" size by all but two of the
ten institutions, and Standard Oil Company of Indiana and Du Pont by all but
three. Taking the ten institutions as a single group, the largest common share holding was in Standard -Oil Company of New Jersey, followed in order by General
Electric Company, Union Carbide & Carbon, Sears Roebuck, Standard Oil Company
of Indiana, Du Pont, International Harvester, Westinghouse Electric, and Socony
Vacuum.P
With the growth in common stock commitments which has characterized most
'Pp. 24-25.
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endowed funds in recent years there has been developed not only the problem of
selection of individual securities, but also the problem of timing in effecting sales and
purchases. Moreover, the ultimate maximum size of equity investments in relation
to total holdings has become of more than academic importance. Various approaches
to these problems have been made. So-called "formula plans" have been developed
as affording a check upon judgment or, in some cases, a substitute for judgment.
Faggiano in his thesis, "Investment Trends in College and University Endowment
Funds," describes the objectives of such plans as follows:'2
The control of investments in equities by a mathematical formula is merely a means of

attempting to improve the "timing" of such investments, either as to their sale or purchase,
with an effort to eliminate the influence of emotional judgment.

Formula plans are generally of one of two types; constant stock-bond ratio plan
or variable stock-bond ratio plan. A typical constant ratio plan would establish the
"normal" desired relationship between fixed interest obligations and equities for a
given account. Let us assume that a 50-50 relationship was selected. The account
would be reviewed and revalued at regular stated intervals, possibly quarterly or
semiannually. When the relationship changed by 5 percentage points (for example,
equities 55 per cent of total market value, fixed interest securities 45 per cent) then
sales and reinvestments would be made in an amount sufficient to restore the
original ratio. Faggiano points out1 3 that in order to bring about a change of 5 percentage points in a 50-50 stock-bond plan, stocks would have to increase more than
20 per cent in market value, assuming no change in bond values. The actual change
in percentages brought about by a io per cent advance in stock prices would be
52.38 per cent and 47.62 per cent, while a 20 per cent advance in stock prices would
create a 54.55 per cent and 4545 per cent relationship. In discussing the constant
ratio plan Faggiano states,' 4
Among the drawbacks often pointed to in the constant stock ratio plans is the fact that
with the same ratio of bonds to stocks at virtually all times it means that the money risk
in stocks may be high at the top of a bull market when it might be desirable to have fewer
stocks, and static at the bottom of a bear market when it might be desirable to own more
stocks. The chances of capital growth under the constant-ratio plan, in other words, are
quite modest in comparison to the potentials in the more complicated and intricate type
of plan.
Discussing the variable stock-bond ratio plan, Faggiano continues,'

5

Variable bond-stock ratio plans are designed to overcome the objections to proportions in
stocks that would be constant at the top of a market as they are at the bottom and refined
to accentuate the emphasis in the direction of utmost gains and minimized losses. In
other words, the attempt under the variable plans is to decrease proportions in stocks as
prices rise, and increase as prices decline. This usually requires more guesswork as to
the swings in the market.., and may result in embarrassment in the eventuality that the
market does not perform as predicted. Of course, provided one waits long enough the
opportunity to carry through such a plan would be presented ultimately....
2P. 86.
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income from such a plan . . . at the top of a market creates a serious problem for an
institution dependent upon its income.
As a simplified illustration of theory, a variable plan might call for the following
stock-bond ratios: Dow Jones Industrial Stock Average 150, stock-bond ratio 50-50;
Dow Jones ioo, ratio 75-25; Dow Jones 2oo, ratio 25-75. Historical precedent would
have to be considered to a substantial degree in setting the minimum and maximum
stock-bond ratios. However, stock price averages have not always fluctuated in
complete cycles. Despite Faggiano's assertion that ultimately a variable ratio plan
would function, there is evidence that certain stock levels previously regarded as
within the range of normal fluctuation, may not recur. On this point, Oliver J.
Gingold, writing in the Wall Street Journal of July 30, i95i in his column "Abreast
of the Market," says :16
Since its compilation in 1897 the industrial average has closed under 200 at least once
each year....
It is submitted that there will come a year in which the low price recorded
for the industrial average will be 200 or above ....
Until x925, the 29 th year that the
industrial average had been compiled, it never had failed to sell under ioo. Until 1927,
one would always have been safe in waiting for a close under x5o before making commitments. But the next time it violated either level was in 1939. In the intervening
• . . years, the average much more than doubled in price....
Looked at in opposite fashion, there never was a year until 19o6 when industrials sold
as high as ioo on the average. This would have made it logical for present-day apologists
for the 200 level to suggest that a sale at 99.99 was eminently sound. By the same token
the average never topped 150 until 1925, nor 200 until 1927, nor 300 until 1928. It is
also true that the industrial average set a new record high in 13 of the first 32 years it was
compiled, yet more than two decades have passed since a new high was set....
The warning implicit in these figures is simply that it may be dangerous to make a
fetish of a high-water mark in a growing economy, particularly one into which periodic
wars have frozen a certain amount of inflation. Only in the five-year span, 1938-1942,
have the annual industrial average highs shown a declining trend for more than three
years.

The policy "if you can't beat them, join them" is suggested in the theory that
rather than try to judge "timing" it is better to ignore it, through making purchases
at regular intervals, irrespective of price levels. Such a theory would apply particularly to growing funds, such as pension funds, where new money becomes available for investment at fixed times. Purchases made on such a basis will, of course,
produce cost prices for securities in line with past average prices on purchase dates.
In an article entitled, "Common Stocks in Pension Funds" in the July 26, 1951
Commercial and Financial Chronicle,Mr. David L. Terwilleger of Kidder, Peabody
& Co. argues in favor of investing regular amounts annually in common stocks.
Figures which he presents show that such investments, under the conditions assumed,
would-have provided a fund with greater income and greater capital enhancement
than an equal investment in bonds. In describing his method Mr. Terwilleger
states :17
"sP. I', cols. 3 and 4.

"¢P. 4, cols. 4 and 5.

INVsmMNT Pit orAcEs OF ENDOWAMNTS AND PENSION FuNDS

Over the 31 year period, 1920 through 1950, $00,O00 invested at Dec. 31 each year in
the stocks which make up Dow-Jones Industrial Average would have had a market value
of $5,637,363 at the end of the period. This is $2,537,363 or 82% more than the total of
$3,oo,ooo invested during the period. The same amount of money would have a value
of $3,731,188 had it been invested at the same times in the bonds contained in Standard
& Poor's Corporate Bond Average. . . . Stock prices would have to recede 45%, or to
1:29.48 for the Dow, in order to eliminate all profit.... The average Dow-Jones Industrial
stock price for the period was 148.47.... Bond prices could decline only 17% before
gains are wiped out. This would be to ioo.7 for the bond average. The average return
over these 3X years from dividends on stocks in the table was 6.o%, or one-third greater
than the 4.5% on bonds (on a current yield basis). Dividends on stocks totalled
$3,258,735, or 53% more than the $2,127,64o cash income from bonds.... Total income
from dividends plus market appreciation for stocks is $5,796,o98. The comparable figure
for bonds is $2,758,828. This large differential of $3,037,260 is a combined improvement
of oo% in favor of stocks over bonds. . . . In a portfolio of high grade bonds with
maturities spaced it is possible to obtain a yield of 2Y%, today. It is also possible to obtain
a dividend return of 6% from a representative ilst of high grade common stocks.... If
Pension Fund "A" is Sr,ooo,ooo invested in bonds, yielding 2 %, the income compounded annually over a 31-year period will amount to $1,150,007. If Pension Fund
"B" is $i,oooooo invested 75% in bonds yielding 2 % and only 25% in stocks yielding
6%, the income compounded annually from the bond segment ($750,000) will amount
to $862,5o5 and the income from the stock segment (only $250,000) will amount to
$1,272,025. Total income received will be $2,134,530. Fund "B" will produce $984,523,
or approximately 84%, more income than Fund "A" merely by investing 25% in stocks.
The relatively small amount of Fund "B" invested in stocks will produce more income
than the whole of Fund "A."
...

The primary investment requirement of endowed funds is to maintain and
increase dollar income without excessive risk to principal. This requirement becomes
all the more imperative during a period such as the present when a larger number
of dollars is required each year to accomplish a given task. This requirement,
however, becomes more difficult of achievement when the rate of income from the
major earning asset of endowments, namely, high grade bonds, is depressed and
kept at an artificially low rate. During the past twenty years endowed funds have
turned increasingly towards common stocks as a means of bolstering income. This
greater dependence upon equities has created problems of selection of individual
securities, of timing in connection with purchases and sales, and of stability of income at various levels of business activity. Various technical devices have been
developed to assist in the solution of these problems, but none appears sufficiently
flexible or adaptable to provide a total answer to the varying requirements of individual funds. Judgment and experience will continue to be the most valuable
tools available for the job to be done. In view of the indispensable contributions
which our endowed institutions have made, are making, and have the opportunity
to make to our civilization, it is to be hoped that time, effort, and skill will be
brought to bear in full measure upon the investment management operations of our
endowed institutions.

